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Abstract
Do public sector wages exert pressures on private sector wages, or has the private sector
a leadership role in wage setting?
one sector might exert on the other by controlling for other determinants of wages (prices,
productivity, institutions) for the main euro area economies (Germany, France, Italy and Spain)
and the periods 1980-2007 and 1991-2007. It exploits available quarterly information not yet
time series models. The quarterly frequency of our data allows us to check the existence of
purely intra-annual links between public and private sector wages (signalling eﬀect). There is
strong evidence of public wages’ leadership, either in conjunction with bi-directional links from
the private sector (Germany and Spain) or pure public wage leadership (France in the sample
1991-2007, Italy for within-the-year linkages).
JEL Classiﬁcation: C32, C53, J30, J51, J52, E62, E63, H50, H6
Keywords: government wages, private sector wages, signalling, causality, mixed frequency
data, causal graph.
This paper tries to isolate the pure signalling eﬀect that
used in the literature, and combines diﬀerent data sources in the framework of mixed-frequencies5
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Non technical summary
This paper empirically analyses the interaction between public and private sector wages for the four
largest countries of the Euro area (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) over the period 1981-2007
using quarterly data. The relevance of this issue is clear from an analytical and policy perspective,
given that the public sector is a key player in the labour market, employing some 20% of the working
population. The determination of wages paid to public employees do not necessarily follow the same
rules as those prevailing in the private sector, given that public employees provide public services
(and goods) arising from social preferences that are not normally oriented to market activities. In
this sense, their productivity, and the link of productivity with wages, is more diﬃcult to assess
than the productivity of workers linked to market-oriented activities. Diﬀerences in wage-setting
behavior can also be attributed to a higher degree of unionisation in the public sector and the
dominant position civil servants might exploit to achieve special wage and employment conditions.
According to the so-called Scandinavian model of wage determination, the tradable-goods sector
would be, by deﬁnition, the wage setting leader and the other sector would follow. This model was
developed for the case of small open economies, and has been highly debated in the Scandinavian
countries. If wages in the sheltered sectors (sectors less open to competition than the tradable-
goods sector) were to grow above those of the tradable-goods sector, this might lead to competitive
losses that might end up damaging the competitiveness of a country. Applied to the interaction
between public and private sector wages, the Scandinavian model suggests that public wages (the
sheltered sector) could exert undue pressure on private sector wages (more open to competition).
Alternatively, and especially in European countries, the available evidence on downward wage
rigidities would give a role to the public sector as a wage leader, in the sense that it might exert a
moderating role as a wage setter in times of recession.
In addition to these direct links between public and private wages, other indirect eﬀects might
exist via prices (wage price indexation) and productivity. Finally, institutional features may play
a role in determining how both sectoral labour markets are linked. First, there may be direct links
via the wage bargaining process. If the government leads, adjustments in quantities (employment)
are more likely to occur in the private sector. By contrast, if the private sector leads, prices (wages)
are commonly adjusted ﬁrst. Second, there are indirect linkages which come from social beneﬁts
and minimum wage levels.
Our study expands the available literature on public-private sector wage leadership for the
biggest euro area countries, namely Germany, France, Italy and Spain, highlighting the intra-annual
inﬂuences across sectors (signalling eﬀects). We build up a quarterly dataset for the period 1980Q1-
2007Q4 by combining available information from the Quarterly Government Finance Statistics
(Eurostat) - not yet exploited in the literature - and other related information on government
sector compensation of employees and government employment available from other sources (non-6
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market services, Federal and Central government variables). Given the sample length of the dataset
we use, we can also analyse if linkages between public and private sector wages have been diﬀerent
in the 1990-2007 sample compared to the 1980-2007 sample, and thus proxy possible inﬂuences of
the European Monetary union.
The main conclusion of our analysis is the existence of robust cross-country empirical evidence
of mostly direct signals (intra-annual links) between wages in the public and the private sector.
The results are broadly similar across the two selected samples. They are reinforced in a restricted
VAR estimation. By this we mean that we leave out some quarterly information in order to isolate
purely within-the-year interactions between wages in both sectors. Our results show strong linkages
between wages in both sectors, with a predominance of bidirectional links in the cases of Germany
and Spain. In addition, leadership of public wages in France in the sample 1991-2007, and in the
case of Italy for within-the-year estimations are quite robust features of our data. Our empirical
approach allows us to also unveil a complex and rich structure of indirect links of wages with other
variables (prices, productivity, institutional factors).
Some policy implications are worth mentioning. Firstly, public sector wages play an important
role in the determination of labour costs in the major euro area economies. Secondly, this role is
relatively more important when only within-the-year links are considered (inﬂuence in the wage
negotiation phase). Thirdly, institutional features also have a role in setting the links between
wages, prices and productivity.7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1148
January 2010
1 Introduction
This paper empirically analyses the interaction between public and private sector wages for the four
largest countries of the Euro area (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) over the period 1981-2007
using quarterly data. The relevance of this issue is clear from an analytical and policy perspective,
given that the public sector is a key player in the labour market, employing some 20% of the
working population. The determination of wages paid to public employees do not necessarily
follow the same rules than the ones prevailing in the private sector, given that public employees
provide public services (and goods) arising from social preferences that are not normally oriented
to market activities. In this sense, their productivity, and the link of productivity with wages, is
more diﬃcult to assess than the productivity of workers linked to market-oriented activities. In
addition, the theoretical literature highlights some possible reasons why public sector wages could
follow diﬀerent setting rules than those in the private sector, like a higher degree of unionisation in
the public sector or the dominant position civil servants might exploit to achieve special wage and
employment conditions.
To the light of the so-called Scandinavian model of wage determination (see, for example,
Strom, 1997), the tradable-goods sector would be, by deﬁnition, the wage setting leader and the
other sector would follow. This model was developed for the case of small open economies, and
has been highly debated in the Scandinavian countries. If wages in the sheltered sectors (sectors
less open to competition than the tradable-goods sector) were to grow above those of the tradable-
goods sector, this might lead to competitive losses that might end up damaging the competitiveness
of a country. Against the background of this Scandinavian model, the parallel in the case of the
interaction between public and private sector wages would be a case in which public wages (the
sheltered sector) would exert undue pressure on private sector wages (more open to competition).
Alternatively, and especially in European countries, the available evidence on downward wage
rigidities would give a role to the public sector as a wage leader, in the sense that it might exert a
moderating role as a wage setter in times of recession, and thus inﬂuence the overall adjustment in
the economy when needed.
In addition to these direct links between public and private wages, other indirect eﬀects might
exist via prices and productivity. For example, collective bargaining agreements may contain sector-
speciﬁc clauses which protect workers against non-expected increases in prices (wage price indexa-
tion) which will cause automatic increases in wages. In the case of productivity, the issue remains as
to how market and non-market related activities reﬂect productivity increases via wage increases.
Finally, institutional features may play a role in determining how both sectoral labour markets
are linked. On the one hand, one may observe direct links via the wage bargaining process. If the
government leads, adjustments in quantities (employment) are more likely to occur in the private
sector. By contrast, if the private sector leads, prices (wages) are commonly adjusted ﬁrst. On the8
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other hand, indirect linkages which come from social beneﬁts and minimum wage levels should be
noted.
The empirical literature on public or private sector wage leadership is relatively scarce. Against
the framework of the Scandianvian model of inﬂation a rich set of papers for the Swedish economy
have exploited the issue. Lindquist and Vilhelmsson (2006) apply a vector error correction approach
to wage setting in Sweden with annual data for the period 1970-2002, and ﬁnd long-run wage
leadership of the private sector and no Granger causation from the public to the private sector
in the short run, in line with the results previously obtained by Jacobson and Ohlsson (1994).
However, some authors (see Friberg, 2007, Holmund and Ohlsson, 1992, and Tagstrom, 2000,
among others) have found empirical evidence which point in the opposite direction. Some studies
for other countries like Demekas and Kontolemis (1999) -for Greece-, Mizala and Romaguera (1995)
-for Chile-, and Christou, Klemm and Tiﬃn (2007) -for Romania- show no clear-cut conclusions
about a prevalent leadership role.
A broader study covering most euro area countries and other OECD countries is Lamo, P´ erez
and Schuknecht (2008). Using a cross-country dataset of annual data, they ﬁnd robust contempo-
raneous correlation and feedback eﬀects between private and public wages which occur in a direct
manner, but also via prices (causality in nominal terms that disappears when the price level is
included - “second round eﬀects”). Causality from the private to the public sector dominates. Nev-
ertheless, there are many instances in which public wages lead. Finally, they are able to rationalise
the heterogeneity of leadership behaviour found across countries in the cross-country heterogeneity
present in institutional variables.1
Our study expands the available literature on public-private sector wage leadership for the
biggest euro area countries, namely Germany, France, Italy and Spain, highlighting the intra-
annual inﬂuences across sectors (signalling eﬀects). We can do this because we do not use annual
data as in Lamo, P´ erez and Schuknecht (2008) or Lindquist and Vilhelmsson (2006). On the
contrary, we build up a quarterly dataset for the period 1980Q1-2007Q4 by using time series
mixed-frequencies models, along the lines of Harvey and Chung (2000), Proietti and Moauro (2006)
and Pedregal and P´ erez (2009). This approach allows us to use available information from the
Quarterly Government Finance Statistics (Eurostat) not yet exploited in the literature, together
with other related information on government sector compensation of employees and government
employment available from other sources (non-market services, Federal and Central government
1Some studies make use of pooled, annual data, and look at the average relationship between public and private
wages, without focusing on a speciﬁc country. A seminal study along these lines is Alesina et al. (2002) that ﬁnd
a sizeable negative eﬀect of public spending and in particular of its wage component (wage bill) on private sector
proﬁts and on business investment for a pool of OECD countries. On related grounds see Afonso and Gomes (2008).
Algan et al. (2002) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative correlation between employment in the public and the private sector
in a pool of OECD countries.9
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variables). Given the sample length of the dataset we use, we can also analyse if linkages between
public and private sector wages have been diﬀerent in the 1990-2007 sample compared to the 1980-
2007 sample, and thus proxy possible inﬂuences of the European Monetary union.
The theoretical literature provides some insights on the empirical models to be used. We set up
a VAR empirical model that can be rationalized theoretically along the lines of the public-private
union competition models of Maﬀezzoli (2001) and Ardagna (2007). In order to assess the existence
of intra-annual signalling eﬀects, in addition to a standard VAR approach with quarterly data, we
estimate a restricted version of the VARs in which only within-the-year observations are used. In
addition, we also interpret the output of the VARs along the lines of the literature on causal graphs
(Lauritzen and Richardson, 2002, Demiralp and Hoover, 2003, Eichler, 2007).
The main conclusion of our analysis is the existence of robust cross-country empirical evidence
of mostly direct signals (intra-annual links) between wages in the public and the private sector.
The results are broadly similar across the two selected samples. They are reinforced in a restricted
VAR estimation. By this we mean that we leave out some quarterly information in order to isolate
purely within-the-year interactions between wages in both sectors. Our results show strong linkages
between wages in both sectors, with a predominance of bidirectional links in the cases of Germany
and Spain. In addition, leadership of public wages in France in the sample 1991-2007, and in the
case of Italy for within-the-year estimations are quite robust features of our data. Our empirical
approach allows us to also unveil a complex and rich structure of indirect links of wages with other
variables (prices, productivity, institutional factors).
Moreover, we ﬁnd robust evidence of the existence of a complex structure of indirect links via
control variables. Some interesting conclusions emerge from the analysis of institutional control
variables: (i) public ownership of strategic sectors ﬁrms negatively aﬀects worker productivity; (ii)
the size of the government decreases the probability of public sector wage leadership, specially in the
cases of Germany and Spain, and to a lesser extent France and Italy; (iii) employment protection
legislation damages labour productivity in the case of Spain, while it seems to have a positive eﬀect
in Germany; (iv) union density increases the probability of public wage leadership in Germany and
Spain in the whole sample, that disappears when the 80s are excluded from the sample.; (v) the
variable measuring globalisation exerts a positive eﬀect on productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the empirical strategy
used. In Section 3 we present the quarterly data used and the mixed-frequency approach used to
interpolate part of the sample. In Section 4 we present the main results obtained and in section 5
the main conclusions of the study.10
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2 Empirical Strategy
The models in Ardagna (2007) and Maﬀezzoli (2001) provide a framework in which workers’ trade
unions in the public and the private sector try to maximise the wages of their aﬃliates, thus leading
to a set of reaction functions in which wages in one sector react to wages in the other sector, in
such a way that:
log(wpt/P)=f (log(wgt/P),technological parameters,...)( 1 )
log(wgt/P)=f (log(wpt/P),technological parameters,...)( 2 )
where wpt represents the after-tax private sector nominal wage, wgt the after-tax public sector
nominal wage and P the price level.
The problem we are interested in ﬁts very well in a theoretical framework of this kind. One
sector union’s react to changes in wages in the other sector, via envy eﬀects. Upon this basis, we
consider an empirical model in which nominal public and private-sector wages are jointly determined
in the presence of endogenous variables, such as productivity and prices, and exogenous variables
(institutional features). Equations (1) and (2) can be expressed in empirical terms in a standard
VAR framework as follows
Yt = C +
p 
j=1
BjYt−j + GZt + εt (3)
where: (1) Yt is the vector of endogenous variables (wPu, wPr, P and A); wPu denotes compen-
sation per employee in the public sector, wPr compensation per employee in the private sector, P
the expected price level (proxied here by current prices), and A total economy labour productivity;
(2) Zt is a set of exogenous variables encompassing a set of institutional variables (that will be
described in a subsequent section of the paper).
The VAR speciﬁcation provides a regression framework with control variables, a standard envi-
ronment of a strand of the empirical literature which explores the signalling role of speciﬁc variables.
Illustrative examples are the following: (i) ﬁrms’ dividends signalling role (see Garrett and Priest-
ley, 2000); (ii) education as a signal used by employers because of its relationship with desired
characteristics of workers (see Weiss, 1995, and Tyler et al., 2000); (iii) market yields have recently
become much better predictors of monetary policy movements (see Lange et al., 2003).
Following Toda and Yamamoto (1995), we assume that a VAR in levels can be used to test
general restrictions even in the presence of integrated or cointegrated series. First, a usual lag
selection procedure is used with the aim of determining the lag length (p∗)t ob eu s e di nt h eV A R 2.
Next, a  p = p∗ + pmax th-order VAR is estimated, where pmax is the maximal order of integration
suspected to occur among the variables involved. In order to test for wage leadership or signalling
2The maximum (across countries) median value of Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn and Akaike criteria is used.11
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behaviour, we carry out a conditional Granger causality test using equation (3) for each country
and sample period considered in our analysis.





































































γjAt−j +δZt + εt
where qi
y refers to i − th quarter’s data and y to the current year.
In addition to the previous standard analysis, we carry out a restricted estimation. By this
we mean that we leave out some quarterly information in order to isolate purely within-the-year
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Notice that the ﬁrst quarter of each year for private sector wages is allowed to be inﬂuenced
by public wages in previous years’ quarters, while the second, third and fourth quarters are only
allowed to be inﬂuenced by public wages in the previous quarters of the same year. We carry out
this restricted estimation to isolate possible inﬂuences of wage negotiations in one sector aﬀecting
wage negotiations in the other sector. Normally wage negotiations are signed within the same year,
or at the beginning of the ﬁrst quarter of the subsequent year at the maximum. We presume this
assumption is a fair proxy to standard practice3.
In order to provide some advanced intuition that could help frame the empirical results, we
provide some theoretical insights in the rest of this section on the basis of causal graphs. The
3Khun and Gu (1999), among others, deals with the learning process derived from sequential negotiations (captured
by our full estimation). By contrast, our restricted estimation aims to break these links and isolate the eﬀect of the
contemporaneous (within-the-year) negotiations. Moreover, we have carried out a sensitivity analysis in which we
allow all periods of current year to depend on the last quarter of the previous year, observing that our main results
and conclusions remain.12
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procedure we use to compute them is as follows: (i) First, we carry out conditional causality tests
for all the pairs of variables of the model (wPu, wPr, P and A), (ii) Then, we draw a causal map
including an arrow for those cases in which a signiﬁcant causal eﬀect is obtained. Moreover, we
highlight (using a thicker line) the central links for our study (wPr ↔ wPu) over the other ones.
Figure 1 shows some theoretical insights on how private and public wages might interact using
causal graphs. These ﬁgures help us to observe how indirect eﬀects may also inﬂuence (by compen-
sating, reducing or reinforcing) the intensity of the direct eﬀect we observe between from wPr to
wPu (left panel, thicker line) might be related to the direct inﬂuence of wPr and wPu; nevertheless,
the inﬂuence of wPr on wPu may also reﬂect other indirect eﬀects that P and A may have on wPu
via wPr. In addition, direct eﬀects from P and A may also exist. As an example, clauses which pro-
tect workers against non-expected increases in prices (indexation of wages by prices) may inﬂuence
the evolution of wages. The inverse eﬀect (from wages to prices) may be understood as inﬂationary
eﬀects (second-round eﬀects) derived from increases in wages. In addition, interactions between
productivity and wages can be explained by appealing to the eﬃciency wages’ theory (employers
aim at increasing workers’ productivity by increasing their wage or to ensure their continuity in the
ﬁrm -see Johansen and Strom, 2003-) or to the compensation payment theory (ﬁrms are not able to
observe worker’s productivity and only can adjust their wages subsequently). Finally, although the
links between inﬂation and productivity are not central to our study, they may aﬀect our conclu-
sions and are consequently considered. These links have been previously analyzed in the literature
by Ram (1987) and Freeman and Yerger (2000), among others. The basic intuition is that, on the
one hand, prices may inﬂuence labour productivity by modifying the real wage and, on the other
hand, changes in productivity modify aggregate supply and may, therefore, aﬀect prices.
To the light of causal graphs, ﬁgure 2 shows some meaningful examples which could be useful
in understanding the empirical results obtained later on in the paper. The top-left panel shows
a scenario in which prices would be the common cause for both sectors’ wages. Thus, we can
not conclude that public and private sector wages are not linked. This may be the situation
in an economy with a relevant presence of wage price indexation clauses in collective bargaining
agreements. The top-right panel shows a case in which a government would identify the productivity
of its workers by looking at the productivity level internalized by private wages. This scheme is
consistent with the Scandinavian model explained above. The bottom-left panel displays a situation
in which prices are inﬂuenced simultaneously by public sector and private sector wages, which are
not directly connected between themselves. However, one may conclude that they are linked to
some extent as they aﬀect a common variable. A signiﬁcant eﬀect between public and private wages
might have emerged in this case whether one had excluded prices from an estimated model. This
scenario is consistent with the existence of second-round eﬀects. The bottom-right panel shows
a case in which private sector wages lead public sector wages, and at the same time wages aﬀect
productivity. This situation would be consistent with the eﬃciency wages theory.13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1148
January 2010
3 The data
3.1 General government variables
As regards data on public sector wages and employment, the European System of National Ac-
counts (ESA-95) provides only limited published time series and/or time coverage. As regards
compensation of government sector employees, Eurostat (EU’s statistical agency) started to dis-
seminate recently quarterly series, fully consistent with the already existing annual ﬁgures (see the
discussion in Pedregal and P´ erez, 2009). Nevertheless, the starting point of these series is relatively
short, ranging in our case from 1991Q1 in the case of France to 1999Q1 in the cases of Germany
and Italy. At the same time, the ESA95 framework provides related quarterly series under the
heading “Compensation of employees in other services”, the basis of which is compensation in
non-market services, the main part of which is the government sector. This information can be
used as an indication of the target concept of “general government compensation of employees”.
Furthermore, it is possible to obtain monthly and quarterly information on personnel expenditures
by some sub-sectors of the general government sector, typically the central or Federal government
sectors.4
The situation is quite diﬀerent for the case of government employment. EU member states do
not generally report to Eurostat standardized annual employment ﬁgures for the general government
sector. Thus, in most cases it is necessary to resort to national sources, and the issue of homogeneity
across countries is more delicate. The OECD Economic Outlook database presents the best choice
as regards cross-country availability and homogeneity of annual data in this respect. For statistical
issues regarding the deﬁnition of government employment see OECD (1997). As in the case of
compensation of government employees, in order to obtain quarterly information, it is possible
to resort to ESA95 ﬁgures on “Employment in other services”, the bulk of which are related to
government (non-market) activities. We take the avenue of using as much oﬃcial information
as possible, especially as regards recently available quarterly compensation of employees series
provided by Eurostat. At the same time, given the limitations of the information available (annual
frequency), we make extensive use of other sources of quarterly information, in particular that
related to non-market services.
To use all this information in the most eﬃcient way, we set up mixed-frequencies time series
models, as described in Appendix A. These models allow us to also tackle a problem related with
newly available compensation of government employees and employment series. Eurostat does not
4We focus on total compensation rather than on wages for two reasons. The ﬁrst one is practical: there is no data
with the same level of coverage and detail for wages than the one we use for compensation. The second is conceptual.
We follow Feldstein (2008) and prefer to use compensation as a broader concept of personnel expenditures. Fringe
beneﬁts, noncash payments and other beneﬁts play an important role in wage negotiations and thus set the grounds
for potential spillover eﬀects via “envy eﬀects” between the public and the private sector.14
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provide seasonally adjusted series. We seasonally adjust the series within the selected time series
models.
3.2 Other variables
Table 1 details all data sources.
Given the public sector variables, the corresponding private sector variables are obtained as the
diﬀerence between the total economy variable and the estimated public sector variable. Our variable
of interest in each sector is then obtained by dividing compensation of employees by employment.
Figure 3 shows the resulting compensation per employee series in the public and the private sector
for the four countries considered. As a measure of P, we use the private consumption deﬂator5.
Productivity (A) is deﬁned as total economy labor productivity for the whole economy. Regarding
institutional variables, we consider the following: (i) the size of the public sector as an employer,
measured as the ratio of public employment and total employment (SIZEPu); (ii) an indicator of
public sector ownership, OWNPu (see Conway and Nicoletti, 2006); (iii) a globalization index (see
Drehen, 2008), GLOB, which measures the degree of openness of the economy; (iv) an indicator
which codiﬁes the existing employment protection legislation (EP); (v) the degree of unionisation of
the labour market, through two variables: union density -UD- which is deﬁned as the ratio between
union membership and employment, and union coverage -UC- which measures the percentage of
workers which are covered by collective agreements; (vi) the degree of bargaining coordination -
COW- and centralization -CEW-, as deﬁned in Nickell (2006). Some of the institutional variables
are not available for the whole sample, and thus some kind of extension is needed; for the variables
showing stable values over the previous periods, we just keep the same levels; otherwise we use
simple trends to interpolate or extrapolate the series.
4 Results
As stated above, our empirical strategy is as follows. A conditional causality analysis is carried out
between the variables which compose Y for two diﬀerent sample periods (1981-2007 and 1991-2007).
Figures 4-7 show the P-values resulting from our conditional causality analysis, the sign of
coeﬃcients related to institutional features variables and the causal map generated combining this
information. Based on these results, the main conclusion we draw is the robust cross-country
empirical evidence of mostly direct intra-annual links observed between both sector wages. Some
heterogeneity of results emerges though, when looking in detail at country speciﬁc results. Firstly,
in the case of Germany, the leadership role is mostly assumed by the private sector although the
public sector gains relative relevance during the 1990s and when only the within-the-year eﬀects are
5The results in qualitative terms are similar if we use the GDP deﬂator. The results are available upon request.15
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considered. Secondly, for France, when the 1980s are included, the private sector leads clearly the
wage setting process. By contrast, when the sample period starts in the 1990s, the public sector
leads. Thirdly, in the case of Italy, a stronger relationship between both sector wages is observed
when the 1980s are in our sample. Indeed, the public sector leads if only within-the-year linkages are
considered. Otherwise, the private sector seems to lead. Finally, the Spanish case shows a robust
bi-directional link between both sector wages in our baseline estimation for the whole sample, while
in the restricted case (within-the-year linkages) the public sector leads for the whole period but
the private sector leads for the 1991-2007 sample. All in all, for the sample covering the 1981-
2007 period, we ﬁnd evidence of increased public sector leadership in the restricted estimation case
(Germany, Spain, and Italy). On the contrary, for the sample starting from the 1990s, we observe
this eﬀect only for Italy. This means that “signalling eﬀects” might have lost prominence in the
past two decades for Germany and Spain.
We also ﬁnd strong evidence of persistence in public and private sector wages. The past of each
sector wages shows predictive power for the future of wages in this very sector. This can also be
seen as evidence in favour of wage stickiness.
Causal graphs (at the bottom of each ﬁgure) show a complementary view of our results by
drawing the direct links for each country included in this study. The level of signiﬁcance used as a
reference is 10 % as standard in this literature. Some issues are worth highlighting to the light of
these ﬁgures. First, we ﬁnd robust evidence of wage price indexation for the whole set of countries
but this eﬀect is less important from the 1990s. Second, wages exert pressures on prices, specially
for Germany and France. Third, eﬃciency wages theory helps to explain the role of productivity for
Germany and France whereas Spain and Italy evidence is consistent with compensation payments’
theory.
In addition, some interesting conclusions emerge from the analysis of institutional control vari-
ables: (i) The size of the government decreases the probability of public sector wage leadership,
specially in the cases of Germany and Spain, and to a lesser extent France and Italy;6 (ii) public
ownership of strategic sectors ﬁrms negatively aﬀects worker productivity; (iii) employment protec-
tion legislation damages labor productivity in the case of Spain, while it seems to have a positive
eﬀect in Germany; (iv) union density increases the probability of public wage leadership in Ger-
many and Spain in the whole sample, that disappears when the 80s are excluded from the sample;
(v) the variable measuring globalization exerts a positive eﬀect on productivity developments.
6Notice that, for those countries, the coeﬃcients related to SIZE
Puin estimations with w
Pr and w
Puas dependent
variables are signiﬁcant and present opposite signs. Thus, any change of SIZE
Pu will reduce the links between both
sectors wages.16
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5 Conclusions
This paper deals with the interactions between public and private sector wages. This issue has been
previously explored by other authors (Lamo, P´ erez and Schuknecht, 2008, among others), but we
use instead of annual data, quarterly data in order to explore what the intra-annual interactions
are. A conditional causality analysis is carried out which also considers the existing indirect links
with other endogenous variables, such as prices and productivity (in line with empirical papers
facing “signalling” issues). Furthermore, a restricted estimation which isolates the within-the-year
eﬀects is also performed.
As regards the interaction of public and private sector wages, the main conclusion is the robust
cross-country empirical evidence of mostly direct signals (intra-annual links) between both sector
wages. They are reinforced if only periods of the current year are considered. In addition, some
other results are found; (i) evidence of price indexation of wages, (ii) the existence of a signiﬁcant
role of labor productivity in determining wages. Finally, the heterogeneity of our results is not
surprising given the diﬀerent institutional framework and set-ups across countries. Nevertheless,
some patterns can be found throughout on the role of public ownership, the size of the government,
employment protection legislation, union density and globalization.
Some policy implications are worth mentioning. Firstly, public sector wages play an important
role in the determination of labor costs in the major euro area economies. Secondly, this role is
relatively more important when only within-the-year links are considered (inﬂuence in the wage
negotiation phase). Thirdly, institutional features also have a role in setting the links between the
variables we manage here: wages, prices and productivity.17
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7 Tables and ﬁgures
Figure 1: Prior theoretical insights on the links between sectoral wages.
Pu w Pr w
{} Given Z = , , , , , , , , Pu Pu Size Own GLOB UC UD EP CEW COW
P A
Total effect on public sector wages
Direct effect (solid line) Indirect effect (dashed line)
Pu w Pr w
P A
Total effect on private sector wages
{} Given Z = , , , , , , , , Pu Pu Size Own GLOB UC UD EP CEW COW
Direct effect (solid line) Indirect effect (dashed line)
Notes: (1) wPu and wPr are public sector and private sector compensation per employee, P the prices level and A the labour
productivity. Institutional features are included by considering the following set of variables; (i) the size of the public sector
(as employer) -SIZEPu- (ii) an indicator which measures the public ownership, -OWNPu-, (iii) a globalization index (see
Drehen (2008)) -GLOB-, (iv) employment protection legislation -EP-, (v) union density -UD-, (vi) union coverage -UC- and
(vii) wage bargaining coordination -COW- and centralization -CEW- (see Nickell (2006)).21
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Figure 2: Causal graphs. Some introductory and economic meaningful examples upon the basis of
our baseline speciﬁcation.
as a common cause common cause






{} Given Z = , , , , , , , , Pu Pu Size Own GLOB UC UD EP CEW COW
screen screen- -off off and
(scandinavian scandinavian model model)
Pr w A Pu w
Pu w Pr w
{} Given Z = , , , , , , , , Pu Pu Size Own GLOB UC UD EP CEW COW
P A
as an unshielded unshielded collider collider
(inflationary or  (inflationary or “ “second second- -round round” ” effects) effects)
P
Pu w Pr w
{} Given Z = , , , , , , , , Pu Pu Size Own GLOB UC UD EP CEW COW
P A
as a shielded shielded collider collider
(efficiency wages theory) (efficiency wages theory)
A
Pu w Pr w
{} Given Z = , , , , , , , , Pu Pu Size Own GLOB UC UD EP CEW COW
P A
Notes: (1) wPu and wPr are public sector and private sector compensation per employee, P the prices level and A the labour
productivity. Institutional features are included by considering the following set of variables; (i) the size of the public sector
(as employer) -SIZEPu- (ii) an indicator which measures the public ownership, -OWNPu-, (iii) a globalization index (see
Drehen (2008)) -GLOB-, (iv) employment protection legislation -EP-, (v) union density -UD-, (vi) union coverage -UC- and
(vii) wage bargaining coordination -COW- and centralization -CEW- (see Nickell (2006)).22
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Table 1: Data Sources
Germany
(2) Spain France Italy
National Accounts (ESA-95) Employment, Other Services 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1990-2007 1980-2007
Eurostat Final consumption of General Government, Current Prices 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Final consumption of General Government, Constant Prices 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Compensation of employees, SA 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Compensation of employees, Other services 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1990-2007 1980-2007
Total employment, domestic 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Labour Productivity, SA 
Q 1991-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Labour Productivity -Index-, SA 
Q 1991-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Labour Productivity, Other Services, SA 
Q 1991-2007 1980-2007 1990-2007 1980-2005
(7)
Economic Outlook  Government final wage consumption expenditure 
A 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
OECD General Government employment 
A 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Compensation of employees
 A 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Total self-employed 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Total employment -national accounts basis- 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Private final consumption expenditure -deflator-
 Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Gross domestic product, value, market prices 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Gross domestic product, volume, market prices 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Government final consumption expenditure, volume 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Dependent employment, Total economy 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Government final consumption expenditure, deflator 
Q 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007 1980-2007
Government Finance Statistics Compensation of employees 
Q 1999-2007 1995-2007 1991-2007 1999-2007
Eurostat
National Accounts (ESA-95) Personnel Expenditure General government (cash) 
Q 1991-2007 ---- ---- ----
Bundesbank, Germany
National Accounts (ESA-95) Compensation of government employees 
M 1980-2007 ---- ---- ----
Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany
National Accounts (ESA-95) Compensation of government employees 
M ---- 1984-2007
(5) ---- ----
Spanish Statistical Institute, Spain
National Accounts (ESA-95) Total Government expenditures 
M ---- ---- 1980-2007 ----
Ministry of Finance, France
National Accounts (ESA-95) Total Government expenditures 
M ---- ---- ---- 1980-2007
Banca d'Italia, Italy
























CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set Employment Protection legislation 
A 1980-2003 1980-2003 1980-2003 1980-2003
Nickell (2006) Employment Protection legislation 
A 1980-2003 1980-2003 1980-2003 1980-2003
Union Density 
A 1980-2003 1981-2003 1980-2003 1980-2003
Union Coverage 
A 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000
Wage Bargaining coordination 
A 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000
Wage Bargaining centralization 
A 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000
OECD International Regulation Database Public ownership 
A 1980-2003 1980-2003 1980-2003 1980-2003
Conway and Nicoletti (2006)
KOF Index of Globalization Overall Index 







A = annual, Q = quarterly, M = monthly.
Notes: (1) “—-” means that this variable is not used for this country. (2) Before 1991, Western Germany is considered. (3)
Before 2005, only the second quarter is available. (4) Before 1996, only the second quarter is available. (5) Jan-2002 and
Dec-2004 is not available. (6) Before 2003, only the ﬁrst quarter is available. (7) Last quarter of 2005 is not available. (8)
Before 1997, only one quarter per year is available.23
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Pu →  0.00*** 0.18 0.04** 0.52 0.00*** 0.02** 0.59 0.03** 0.00*** 0.09* 0.34 0.16 0.00*** 0.01** 0.65 0.25
w
Pr → 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.24 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.06* 0.30 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.03** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05**
P → 0.03** 0.16 0.00*** 0.16 0.36 0.63 0.00*** 0.14 0.01** 0.15 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.22 0.24 0.00*** 0.01**
A → 0.24 0.52 0.01** 0.00*** 0.59 0.39 0.54 0.00*** 0.31 0.00*** 0.07* 0.00*** 0.34 0.01*** 0.12 0.00***
SIZE
Pu (-)*** (+)    (-)**  (+)    (-)*** (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)**  (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)**  (+)    (+)    (+)   
GLOB (-)**  (+)    (-)    (+)*** (-)*   (+)**  (-)    (+)*** (-)**  (-)    (+)    (+)*** (-)*   (-)    (+)    (+)** 
EP (-)*   (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (+)**  (-)    (+)**  (-)    (+)*** (-)    (+)   
UD (+)*** (+)**  (+)*** (+)    (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)    (-)**  (-)    (+)    (+)    (-)*** (-)    (+)    (+)   
UC (-)    (-)    (-)*** (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)*   (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)*** (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)*** (+)   
OWN
Pu (-)*   (-)    (-)**  (-)    (-)    (-)    (-)    (-)    (+)    (+)    (+)    (-)**  (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)** 
COW
CEW
No. Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Panel A: sample period 1981.Q1-2007.Q3
(II) Restricted estimation (I) Baseline estimation (II) Restricted estimation


































A.I A.II B.I B.II
Notes: (1) wPu and wPr are public sector and private sector compensation per employee, P the Private Consumption deﬂator
and A the labour productivity. Institutional features are included as follows; (i) the size of the public sector (as employer)
-SIZEPu- (ii) an indicator of the public ownership, -OWNPu-, (iii) a globalization index -GLOB-, (iv) employment protec-
tion legislation -EP-, (v) union density -UD-, (vi) union coverage -UC- and (vii) wage bargaining coordination -COW- and
centralization -CEW-). (2) The asterisks show which values are signiﬁcant at standard levels. (3) The level of signiﬁcance used
in causal graphs is 10 %.25
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Pu →  0.00*** 0.50 0.70 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.87 0.22 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.73 0.07* 0.00*** 0.05** 0.58 0.15
w
Pr → 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.51 0.01** 0.24 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.06* 0.46 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.15
P → 0.09* 0.25 0.00*** 0.43 0.01** 0.42 0.00*** 0.80 0.36 0.18 0.00*** 0.77 0.42 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.05**
A → 0.23 0.70 0.11 0.00*** 0.40 0.40 0.63 0.00*** 0.02** 0.11 0.42 0.00*** 0.05* 0.00*** 0.67 0.00***
SIZE
Pu (-)    (-)    (-)**  (-)    (-)*   (-)**  (-)*   (-)    (-)    (-)*** (+)    (+)    (-)    (-)*** (-)    (+)   
GLOB (+)*   (-)    (+)    (+)    (+)**  (-)    (+)    (+)    (-)    (-)*** (-)    (-)    (-)    (-)*** (+)    (+)   
EP (-)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)   
UD (+)    (+)    (-)    (+)    (+)    (+)    (+)    (+)   
UC (-)    (-)    (+)*   (-)    (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)   
OWN
Pu (+)    (+)    (+)*   (-)*   (+)    (+)    (+)*   (-)*  
COW (-)**  (+)    (+)    (-)*** (-)*** (+)    (+)    (-)***
CEW
No. Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
(I) Baseline estimation (II) Restricted estimation
Panel B: sample period 1991.Q1-2007.Q3
(I) Baseline estimation


































A.I A.II B.I B.II
Notes: (1) wPu and wPr are public sector and private sector compensation per employee, P the Private Consumption deﬂator
and A the labour productivity. Institutional features are included as follows; (i) the size of the public sector (as employer)
-SIZEPu- (ii) an indicator of the public ownership, -OWNPu-, (iii) a globalization index -GLOB-, (iv) employment protec-
tion legislation -EP-, (v) union density -UD-, (vi) union coverage -UC- and (vii) wage bargaining coordination -COW- and
centralization -CEW-). (2) The asterisks show which values are signiﬁcant at standard levels. (3) The level of signiﬁcance used
in causal graphs is 10 %.26
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Pu →  0.00*** 0.10* 0.62 0.31 0.00*** 0.04** 0.27 0.11 0.01** 0.33 0.16 0.88 0.00*** 0.09* 0.08* 0.77
w
Pr → 0.00*** 0.02** 0.55 0.19 0.17 0.00*** 0.25 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.68 0.46 0.15 0.01*** 0.20 0.13
P → 0.09* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01** 0.40 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01** 0.69 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.04** 0.11 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01**
A → 0.02** 0.63 0.81 0.00*** 0.29 0.72 0.10 0.00*** 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00***
SIZE
Pu (-)    (+)    (-)*** (+)*** (-)    (+)    (-)*** (+)**  (+)    (+)    (-)    (+)**  (+)    (-)    (-)    (+)*  
GLOB (-)    (+)*   (-)    (+)    (+)    (+)    (-)    (-)    (+)    (+)    (+)    (+)**  (+)    (-)    (-)    (+)   
EP (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)**  (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)*** (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)    (+)    (+)    (-)    (-)** 
UD (-)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)*   (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)**  (+)    (-)   
UC (+)    (-)*** (-)*** (-)*   (+)    (-)*** (-)*** (-)**  (+)    (-)*** (-)*** (-)**  (+)    (-)*** (-)*** (-)** 
OWN
Pu (-)    (+)*   (-)    (-)    (-)    (+)*   (-)*   (-)    (-)    (-)    (-)*** (-)    (-)    (-)    (-)*** (-)   
COW (+)    (-)    (-)    (+)**  (+)    (-)    (-)**  (+)*   (+)    (+)    (-)*** (-)    (+)    (+)*   (-)**  (-)** 
CEW (-)    (+)    (+)    (-)**  (-)    (+)    (+)    (-)*  
No. Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Panel A: sample period 1981.Q1-2007.Q3
(II) Restricted estimation (I) Baseline estimation (II) Restricted estimation


































A.I A.II B.I B.II
Notes: (1) wPu and wPr are public sector and private sector compensation per employee, P the Private Consumption deﬂator
and A the labour productivity. Institutional features are included as follows; (i) the size of the public sector (as employer)
-SIZEPu- (ii) an indicator of the public ownership, -OWNPu-, (iii) a globalization index -GLOB-, (iv) employment protec-
tion legislation -EP-, (v) union density -UD-, (vi) union coverage -UC- and (vii) wage bargaining coordination -COW- and
centralization -CEW-). (2) The asterisks show which values are signiﬁcant at standard levels. (3) The level of signiﬁcance used
in causal graphs is 10 %.27
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Pu →  0.00*** 0.01*** 0.14 0.94 0.00*** 0.01** 0.21 0.86 0.00*** 0.10* 0.13 0.32 0.00*** 0.40 0.02** 1.00
w
Pr → 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01** 0.66 0.23 0.00*** 0.02** 0.58 0.02** 0.00*** 0.52 0.08* 0.05* 0.00*** 0.78 0.37
P → 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.78 0.00*** 0.38 0.00*** 0.46 0.02** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.69 0.04** 0.10 0.00*** 0.97
A → 0.08* 0.00*** 0.23 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.51 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.08* 0.39 0.68 0.00*** 0.17 0.03** 0.78 0.00***
SIZE
Pu (-)*** (+)*** (-)    (+)    (-)*** (+)*** (+)    (+)    (-)*** (+)*** (-)    (+)**  (-)*** (+)*** (-)    (+)   
GLOB (+)*   (+)*** (+)    (+)    (+)    (+)*** (+)    (+)    (-)**  (+)*** (-)    (+)*** (-)**  (+)*** (-)    (+)***
EP (-)    (+)    (+)    (-)*** (-)    (+)    (+)    (-)*** (-)    (+)    (+)    (-)*** (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)***
UD (+)*** (+)**  (+)    (+)**  (+)*** (+)    (-)    (+)**  (-)    (-)    (+)    (+)*** (+)    (+)    (+)    (+)***
UC (+)    (-)    (+)**  (-)    (-)    (+)    (+)    (+)    (-)    (+)    (+)    (+)    (-)    (+)    (+)    (+)   
OWN
Pu (+)*** (-)*** (-)    (-)**  (+)**  (-)*   (+)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)    (+)    (-)    (-)    (-)   
COW (-)**  (+)    (-)**  (-)    (-)**  (+)    (-)    (-)** 
CEW
No. Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
(I) Baseline estimation (II) Restricted estimation
Panel B: sample period 1991.Q1-2007.Q3
(I) Baseline estimation


































A.I A.II B.I B.II
Notes: (1) wPu and wPr are public sector and private sector compensation per employee, P the Private Consumption deﬂator
and A the labour productivity. Institutional features are included as follows; (i) the size of the public sector (as employer)
-SIZEPu- (ii) an indicator of the public ownership, -OWNPu-, (iii) a globalization index -GLOB-, (iv) employment protec-
tion legislation -EP-, (v) union density -UD-, (vi) union coverage -UC- and (vii) wage bargaining coordination -COW- and
centralization -CEW-). (2) The asterisks show which values are signiﬁcant at standard levels. (3) The level of signiﬁcance used
in causal graphs is 10 %.28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1148
January 2010
A Construction of general government series on a quarterly basis
This appendix details how we set-up mixed-frequencies time series models. These models allow
us to achieve long quarterly time series on general government compensation of employees and
employment what constitute an essential input for our analysis. Our approach follows closely
Harvey and Chung (2000), Proietti and Moauro (2005) and Pedregal and P´ erez (2009). The
starting point is to consider a multivariate Unobserved Components Model known as the Basic
Structural Model (Harvey, 1989). A given time series is decomposed into unobserved components
which are meaningful from an economic point of view (trend, Tt, seasonal, St, and irregular, et).
Equation (A4) displays a general form, where t is a time sub-index measured in quarters, zt denotes
the variable in ESA95 terms expressed at an annual and quarterly sampling interval (depending
on availability) for our objective time series (compensation of employees and employment), and ut





= Tt + St + et (A4)
Generally, unobserved components of the same type are allowed to interact but those from
diﬀerent types are independent. For instance, trends are interrelated, but do not depend on seasonal
components. The full model is a standard BSM that may be written in State-Space form as (see
Harvey, 1989)
















where  t ∼ N(0,Σ )a n dvt ∼ N(0,Σvt)
The system matrices Φ, E, H and Hu in equations (A5)-(A6) include the particular deﬁnitions
of the components and all the vector noises have the usual Gaussian properties with zero mean
and constant covariance matrices ( t and vt are correlated among them, but both are independent
of wt). The particular structure of the covariance matrices of the observed and transition noises
deﬁnes the structures of correlations among the components across output variables. Due to the
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In our particular empirical speciﬁcations, for the case of compensation of government employees,
z = [Compensation of government sector employees, (A) from 1981- T−1a n d( Q )f r o m T-end], where
(A)=annual, (Q)=quarterly, and  T indicates the starting date of available quarterly information for
each country and u = [u1,u2,u3]w h e r eu1 is the ﬁnal consumption of general government (Q), u2 is
the compensation of employees, other services (Q), and u3 is either the federal/central government
compensation of employees (M) -(M)=monthly- or total government expenditures (M) when the
former indicator is not available. In the case of the model for government employment z = [general
government employment, A], and u = [u1,u2,u3,u4]w h e r eu1 is other services’ employment (Q), u2
the ﬁnal consumption of general government in real terms (Q), u3 is the estimated compensation
of employees in real terms (Q) (output of the model for compensation), and u4 is other services’
employment -labour force survey ﬁgures- (Q).
In short, we obtain ﬂow, seasonally-adjusted quarterly series for public wages (compensation of
employees) and employment. Figure A1 shows how the estimated series perfectly match the actual
annual and quarterly data for all countries.30
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Figure A1: Actual (Annual and Quarterly) versus Estimated values (4-quarters moving sum)
Compensation of employees (General government)
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